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INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2007,5.1 million people were serving probation, pa-
role, or supervised release in the United States.! This number
represents one in every forty-five adults and continues to increase
every year. Moreover, many individuals commit new crimes while
they are on some form of supervised release. A federal study in 1991
demonstrated that 45 percent of state prison inmates were under con-
ditions of parole or probation at the time they committed their of-
fense.3 Upon finding the fact that defendants committed crimes while
on supervised release for an earlier crime, judges have routinely im-
posed enhanced sentences.
The Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v New Jersey disturbed
this practice of judge-imposed enhancements governing recidivists. The
Apprendi Court held that all facts other than a prior conviction must be
t BA 2006, Yale College; JD Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Lauren E. Glaze and Thomas P Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and
Parole in the United States, 2007: Statistical Tables, table 1 (Dec 2008), online at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009) (reporting 5,117,500
persons under "community supervision" in 2007). Parole is a form of supervision granted by a
parole board to criminals before they serve out their prison terms. State governors usually ap-
point state parole boards, and parole laws vary from state to state. Probation is supervision im-
posed by a court as an alternative to a criminal's incarceration. Congress abolished federal pa-
role in 1984 but retained federal probation under limited circumstances. Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 § 218(a)(5), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 2027 (overhauling the federal
sentencing system and revising bail and forfeiture procedures), repealing 18 USCA § 4201 et seq.
Sixteen states have also abolished discretionary parole, including California and Illinois. Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Reentry Trends in the US: Release from State Prison, online at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/reentry/releases.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009). As an alternative, a
federal court can impose a term of supervised release after the criminal has served out his prison
term. 18 USC § 3583. Because differences between parole, probation, and federal supervised
release are not relevant to the analysis provided in this Comment, I will use the term "supervised
release" throughout to refer to all three, unless a court opinion specifically refers to one particu-
lar type of supervised release.
2 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Statistics: Summary Findings,
online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009); Glaze and Bonczar,
Probation and Parole (cited in note 1).
3 Robyn L. Cohen, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison,
1991 (Aug 1995), online at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppvsp91.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009).
4 530 US 466 (2000).
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found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a crimi-
nal defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum.' After Ap-
prendi, the question arose whether, under the Sixth Amendment, a
jury must find the fact of a criminal defendant's supervised release
status when he commits the new crime. A majority of state and federal
courts have ruled that a person's supervised release status falls under
the "prior conviction exception" carved out in Apprendi's bright-line
rule, and thus a judge may find such facts. The Ninth Circuit and a mi-
nority of state courts have held otherwise.
This Comment concludes that a judge cannot find the fact that
the defendant committed the crime while on supervised release. Part I
traces the development and application of the prior conviction excep-
tion. Part II describes the current split over whether the exception
covers the fact of a person's supervised release status at the time of
the crime. Part III proposes that a judge may only find facts previously
found by a jury or admitted to in a guilty plea in a prior proceeding
resulting in conviction. A defendant's supervised release is not such a
fact. This approach is more consistent with Sixth Amendment case law
than the current positions of courts on both sides of the split. Both the
majority and minority views fail because they allow judges to find
facts that were not previously found by a jury.
I. BACKGROUND LAW
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has a right to
a trial by jury. The Supreme Court has held that this right is guaran-
teed to federal and state defendants Further, the Court has held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quires that federal and state defendants can only be convicted upon
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which [they are] charged."8
5 Id at 490.
6 The Sixth Amendment reads,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
US Const Amend VI.
7 Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145,149-50 (1968).
8 In re Winship, 397 US 358,364 (1970).
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In McMillan v Pennsylvania,9 the Court drew a distinction between
elements of a crime and sentencing factors, where a judge found the
latter by a preponderance of the evidence in order to enhance a defen-
dant's sentence.0 The Court in Almendarez- Torres v United States" then
held that the fact of a defendant's prior aggravated felony was a sen-
tencing factor because it was a fact related to recidivism.
Two years later, the Court in Apprendi replaced the element-
factor distinction with a bright-line rule. The Court held that any fact
that increased a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum
must be pled in an indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." Applying Apprendi's holding, the Court subsequently
overturned several state statutes' as well as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines." The Court did not overrule Almendarez-Torres, whose
holding came to be known as the prior conviction exception,6 but the
scope of the exception remained unclear, namely whether it covered
all facts of recidivism or just the fact of a prior conviction.
Part L.A discusses the Court's earlier approach of distinguishing
elements from sentencing factors. Part I.B presents the current ap-
proach toward jury factfinding first announced in Apprendi and then
solidified in Blakely v Washington." Part I.C traces the evolution of
the prior conviction exception first developed by Almendarez- Torres,
explains how the current approach affirms the exception, and finally
describes the Court's most recent clarification of the exception in
Shepard v United States."
9 477 US 79 (1986).
10 Id at 81-84.
11 523 US 224 (1998).
12 Id at 226-30.
13 Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
14 See, for example, Cunningham v California, 549 US 270, 274-75 (2007) (striking down
California's determinate sentencing law, which permitted a judge to impose an "upper term" sen-
tence when the jury verdict only authorized a "middle term" sentence); Blakely v Washington, 542
US 296, 305 (2004) (deeming unconstitutional Washington's sentencing regime, which authorized
judges to find facts, other than prior convictions, that would enhance the defendant's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum); Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584,588-89 (2002) (striking down a death
penalty provision of Arizona's sentencing statute, which only allowed the judge-found fact of an
aggravating circumstance to enhance a defendant's sentence from life imprisonment to death).
15 The Court held unconstitutional the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which required federal
judges to enhance sentences beyond what a jury verdict authorized upon finding aggravating facts.
Booker v United States, 543 US 220, 222 (2005). The remedial portion of the opinion rendered the
Guidelines advisory, not mandatory, to cure the Sixth Amendment deficiency. Id at 258-67.
16 See, for example, United States v Steed, 548 F3d 961, 979 (11th Cir 2008) ("The prior-
conviction exception derived from the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres.").
17 542 US 296 (2004).
18 544 US 13 (2005).
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A. The Earlier Approach: Elements or Sentencing Factors
In McMillan, the Court drew a distinction between "elements" of
a crime that are necessary for conviction and "sentencing factors" that
are used to increase or decrease a criminal defendant's punishment. 9
The Court held that an element must be found by a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, whereas a sentencing factor could be found by a judge
by a preponderance of the evidence." Following this distinction, the
Court ruled that a judge was permitted to find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during
his crime." The Pennsylvania statute had defined such a fact as a sen-
tencing factor and not an element of the crime. As a result of the
judge's finding, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory mini-
mum under the statute. Under the McMillan approach, the "state leg-
islature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually disposi-
tive." 2 But even so, the Court cautioned that states could not define
elements and sentencing factors however they wanted.23
Nevertheless, the Court in McMillan asserted that the Pennsylva-
nia statute did not transgress "constitutional limits," and thus visible
possession need not be treated as an element.2' The Court distin-
guished McMillan from an earlier decision, Mullaney v Wilbur.2 There,
the Court rejected a Maine murder statute, which provided that the
element of malice would be presumed upon proof of intent to kill re-
26suiting in death. Under the statute, the prosecution did not need to
prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, even though such a fact dif-
ferentiated murder from manslaughter. Upholding the Maine statute
"would leave the State substantially free to manipulate its way out" of
proving every fact necessary to a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.-
According to the McMillan Court, however, none of the burden-
19 477 US at 85-86.
20 Id at 91.
21 Id.
22 Id at 85.
23 McMillan, 477 US at 85 (asserting that there are "constitutional limits" on states' discre-
tion to define elements and sentencing factors but failing to precisely define those limits). See
also Patterson v New York, 432 US 197, 202 (1977) (ruling that state criminal procedures are
usually dispositive, unless they offend "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental") (citation omitted).
24 477 US at 88 (claiming that the statute was not "tailored to permit the visible possession
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense").
25 Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 (1975).
26 Idat686&n3.
27 Id.
28 Jones v United States, 526 US 227,240-41 (1999) (characterizing the statute at issue in Mullaney).
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shifting problems in Mullaney pertained to the judicial factfinding at
issue in McMillan.29
For the next fourteen years until Apprendi, courts relied on legis-
latively drawn distinctions between elements and sentencing factors.
Yet, the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between elements and
sentencing factors and the continuing dangers of legislative manipula-
tion eventually led the Court to adopt a starkly different approach.
B. The Current Approach: The Apprendi Rule
The Court addressed this problem in Apprendi, where it held,
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."31 The
defendant in Apprendi fired multiple shots into the house of an Afri-
can-American family that had moved recently into an all-white neigh-
borhood. The statute at issue allowed the judge to increase the maxi-
mum penalty from an offense range of five to ten years to a range of
ten to twenty years upon a judicial finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant acted with a "racially biased purpose."32 The
Court struck down the New Jersey statute, holding that a jury must find
such a fact beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court provided a survey of
English common law in order to emphasize the importance of the jury
and the limited discretion judges exercised in sentencing.34
In fashioning such a bright-line rule, the Court criticized the
McMillan distinction between elements and sentencing factors as
29 McMillan, 477 US at 87-88.
30 See, for example, United States v Stone, 139 F3d 822,834 n 12 (11th Cir 1998).
31 530 US at 490. The Supreme Court in a recent decision ruled that a judge could make
factual findings other than prior convictions in order to impose consecutive sentences for mul-
tiple offenses, even though the jury verdict only authorized concurrent sentences. Oregon v Ice,
129 S Ct 711, 714-15 (2009). Although this opinion is in tension with (and perhaps contradicts)
Apprendi and later cases upholding it, the Court drew a distinction between Ice and Apprendi.
The Court in Ice explained, "All of [the Apprendi] decisions involved sentencing for a discrete
crime, not-as here-for multiple offenses different in character or committed at different
times." Id at 717. Because this Comment deals with sentencing for a "discrete crime" and not
consecutive sentencing, Ice does not affect the analysis here, even though it may signal future
changes to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
32 Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
33 Id at 474.
34 Id at 478-80 ("[W]ith respect to the criminal law of felonious conduct, the English trial judge
of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing."). For a critique of the
Apprendi Court's analysis of history and the tradition of sentencing, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-
finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L J 1097, 1123-32 (2001)
(arguing that Apprendi undermines the procedural safeguards it purports to uphold).
2009] 1327
The University of Chicago Law Review
"elusive" and "constitutionally novel."3 However, the Court did not
overrule McMillan. Rather, it distinguished the case on the grounds
that McMillan did not deal with an imposition of a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum but involved a mandatory minimum within a
statutory range, where the judge already had authorization based on
the conviction alone to impose a sentence within that range.36
The Court applied and clarified the Apprendi rule in Blakely.37
There, the Court struck down Washington's sentencing regime, which
allowed a judge to find that the defendant acted with "deliberate cru-
elty" to enhance his sentence from fifty-three months to ninety
months.8 Such an enhancement exceeded the statutory maximum be-
cause the judge could impose only the fifty-three month sentence
based on the jury verdict. The Court held that the "statutory maxi-
mum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admit-
ted by the defendant."" After Blakely, courts could no longer interpret
the "statutory maximum" to include a sentence increment based on a
judge-found fact, even though the statute defines the maximum pu-
nishment in that way.
C. The Prior Conviction Exception
Part I.C traces how the prior conviction exception has evolved by
first pointing out its inception in Almendarez- Torres and analyzing the
Court's affirmation and subsequent clarification of the exception.
1. Evolution of the prior conviction exception.
Before Apprendi cast doubt on the element versus sentencing
factor distinction, the Court in Almendarez- Torres held that a judge
could evaluate a defendant's recidivism as a sentencing factor, rather
than an element of the offense, without violating the Sixth Amend-
ment. The Court was interpreting an illegal alien statute,41 in which
the first provision punished reentry into the United States by a pre-
35 Apprendi, 530 US at 494.
36 Id at 487 n 13 ("We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not
involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense
established by the jury's verdict-a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.").
37 See Blakely, 542 US at 301-02.
38 Idat298.
39 Id at 303 (citation omitted).
40 Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 226-27.
41 Id at 226, citing 8 USC § 1326 (governing "Reentry of Removed Aliens").
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viously deported alien by imposing a prison term of up to, but no
more than, two years.2 A second provision punished reentry if the
alien previously was deported due to an aggravated felony conviction
by imposing a prison term of up to twenty years.3 The Court read the
statute's second provision as a sentence enhancement and not as a
separate crime, upholding the district court judge's imposition of an
eighty-five month prison sentence based on his finding that the defen-
dant previously committed an aggravated felony."
As justification, the Court stated that recidivism "is a traditional,
if not the most traditional, basis" for increasing an offender's sen-
tence. 5 Distinguishing recidivism-related facts from all other facts, the
Court reasoned that recidivism is not a fact related to the commission
of the offense." Moreover, the Court pointed out that Congress has
never made recidivism an element of an offense, except in situations
where the conduct itself is already unlawful. 7 Apart from the argu-
ment based on tradition, the Court also noted the risk of prejudice if
courts required juries to find the fact of a prior conviction. 4
Interpreting a statute similarly structured to the one at issue in
Almendarez-Torres, the Court in Jones v United States9 came to a dif-
ferent conclusion without overruling recent precedent.0 Two provi-
sions of the federal carjacking statute authorized imposition of higher
penalties if the offense resulted in "serious bodily injury" or death."
Unlike Almendarez-Torres, the Jones Court held that such provisions
defined distinct offenses and not sentencing factors.52 Thus, a jury
would need to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the carjacking
offense resulted in serious bodily injury or death in order to impose
the additional sentence.
42 See 8 USC § 1326(a).
43 See 8 USC § 1326(b).
44 Alrnendarez-Torres, 523 US at 226-27.
45 Id at 243.
46 Idat244.
47 Id.
48 Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 235 ("As this Court has long recognized, the introduction
of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice."). But see Apprendi, 530 US
at 521 n 10 (Thomas concurring) (pointing out that the defendant may stipulate his prior convic-
tion, or the trial may be bifurcated to prevent the risk of prejudice).
49 526 US 227 (1999).
50 See id at 235-36.
51 18 USC § 2119 (providing a twenty-five-year sentence for inflicting "serious bodily
injury" and a life sentence for causing death).
52 Jones, 526 US at 229.
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In arriving at its conclusion, the Court applied the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, a canon of statutory interpretation that al-
lows the Court to choose one interpretation over another if the latter
raises "grave and doubtful constitutional questions" and the former
does not.53 The Court reasoned that treating the two provisions in
Jones as sentencing factors might violate the Sixth Amendment, and
thus such an interpretation should be avoided in favor of a less prob-
lematic interpretation. Under the canon, the provisions were treated
as setting forth elements of separate crimes to be proven by a jury.'
The Jones Court reconciled its holding with Almendarez-Torres
by ruling that Almendarez-Torres only applied to facts related to reci-
divism."5 In other words, a jury would not need to find facts related to
recidivism even if such facts produced an increase in punishment
beyond what would otherwise have been imposed. In addition to
pointing out that the Almendarez-Torres holding "rested in substantial
part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor,"
the Jones Court offered a second justification for the recidivism excep-
tion later echoed by Apprendi." It asserted that "unlike virtually any
other consideration ... a prior conviction must itself have been estab-
lished through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt,
and jury trial guarantees."7 This statement by the Jones Court suggests
that A lmendarez- Torres was limited only to prior convictions.
2. Upholding the prior conviction exception.
Although Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres, the Ap-
prendi Court sought to narrow its holding by limiting the case to its
facts. Initially, the Court stressed that the defendant in Almendarez-
Torres had admitted to three prior convictions and that he then pro-
ceeded to challenge the sentence increase because the indictment did
not list those convictions.8 Although the Court attempted to frame the
decision as dealing only with the "sufficiency of the indictment" as
opposed to the larger jury question, the result in Almendarez-Torres
still left the defendant without a jury to determine the contested
53 Id at 239-40, quoting United States Attorney General v Delaware & Hudson Co, 213 US
366,408 (1909).
54 Jones, 526 US at 248 ("[Dliminishment of the jury's significance by removing control
over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier
controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.").
55 Id at 249.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Apprendi, 530 US at 488.
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facts.9 To explain this outcome, the Court stated that "the certainty
that procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction ...
mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise
implicated in allowing a judge to determine a 'fact' increasing pu-
nishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range." ° As in Jones,
this statement suggests that the Court in Apprendi read the exception
to jury factfinding as limited only to prior convictions. Although the
Apprendi Court openly speculated that Almendarez-Torres might
have been "incorrectly decided," the Court chose not to overrule Al-
mendarez- Torres's decision because the recidivist issue there was not
contested in Apprendi.6"
Despite Almendarez-Torres's shaky ground, the Court still refused
to overrule Almendarez-Torres when it was presented with the direct
opportunity to do so, six years after Apprendi. In a denial of certiorari,
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, refused to hear a case
involving the same statute at issue in Almendarez- Torres because judi-
cial finding of a defendant's prior conviction history "will seldom create
any significant risk of prejudice to the accused."62 Moreover, Stevens
appealed to stare decisis, noting that "countless judges in countless cas-
es have relied on Almendarez-Torres in making sentencing determina-
tions."6'3 Notably, Stevens dissented in Almendarez- Torres."
3. Shepard's clarification of the prior conviction exception.
Shepard is the Court's most recent clarification of the prior convic-
tion exception, but the decision does not directly address the issue of a
defendant's supervised release status. The Court held that judges could
not examine police reports or complaint applications to clarify a facially
ambigtious conviction document because such reports were "too far
removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record."65
59 See id.
60 Id.
61 Id at 489-90. In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that Almendarez-
Torres was wrongly decided. See id at 520-21 (Thomas concurring). This is significant because
Thomas was part of the 5-4 majority in Almendarez-Torres.
62 Rangel-Reyes v United States, 547 US 1200, 1201 (2006) (denying certiorari).
63 Id.
64 Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 248.
65 Shepard, 544 US at 25. Police reports range widely in their content and in how they are
created. They may contain a police officer's lengthy analysis of an investigation, or a succinct
description of facts at the scene of a crime. Some may be highly subjective, whereas others may
simply be the objective reporting of facts. Officers may rely on witness statements or their own
observations in drawing up a report. States have disallowed or allowed police reports as evidence
at trial depending on their indicia of reliability and whether they fall under the business records
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At issue was whether the defendant had previously been con-
victed of a "generic burglary," defined as burglary of a home or build-
ing, or a "nongeneric burglary," defined as burglary of a ship or motor
vehicle. If the defendant had committed a "generic burglary," then his
sentence would have been enhanced under federal law.6 Massachu-
setts, the state in which Shepard was convicted, did not distinguish
between generic and nongeneric burglary convictions, and the defen-
dant's conviction document pursuant to his guilty plea did not make
67
clear which type he had committed.
The Court ruled that a judge may only look at the "charging doc-
ument, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy be-
tween judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was
confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of
this information." In justification, the Court again relied on the rule
of constitutional avoidance, reasoning that the prior conviction re-
quirement set forth in the statute must be construed narrowly so as
not to raise constitutional doubts.61
II. THE SPLIT
Lower courts have struggled over whether the prior conviction
exception precludes a judge from finding facts related to a defendant's
prior conviction. Specifically, the circuit courts are split as to whether
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find that a defendant commit-
ted an offense while on supervised release. 70 Furthermore, state courts
of last resort are divided on this constitutional issue. Relying on Al-
exception to hearsay. See generally George L. Blum, Admissibility in State Court Proceedings of
Police Reports as Business Records, 111 ALR 5th 1, § 26(a)-(b) (2003). To prevent these eviden-
tiary complications at sentencing, the Shepard Court issued a bright-line rule by refusing to allow
a judge to examine police reports.
66 Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a defendant would receive an enhanced sen-
tence if he had previously been convicted of three violent felonies. 18 USC § 924(e). A burglary
is a violent felony under the Act only if committed in a building or enclosed space, not including
a boat or vehicle. Id.
67 Shepard, 544 US at 17-18.
68 Id at 26.
69 Id at 25-26. Writing for the Court, Justice David Souter stated that the factual findings
here were "too much like the findings subject to Jones and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-
Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute." Id at 25. Justice Thomas, however, disa-
greed and went further by stating that the use of police reports would give rise to constitutional
error, not doubt. See id at 27 (Thomas concurring). As a result, only a plurality of the Court
joined the constitutional doubt argument.
70 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant's parole or probation status at the
time of the offense enables a sentence enhancement beyond the maximum prescribed by statute for
the offense, but does not specify that a jury must find such a fact. See USSG § 4Al.1(d).
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mendarez- Torres, a majority of circuit and state courts have broadly
interpreted the prior conviction exception to allow a judge to enhance
a sentence by finding the fact that the defendant committed his crime
while on supervised release. By contrast, the minority position, relying
on Apprendi, has narrowly interpreted the exception so that a judge
may find prior convictions and other facts reflected in conviction doc-
uments, but not the defendant's supervised release status.
A. The Majority View: Allowing Judges to Find Supervised Release
Status under the Prior Conviction Exception
1. Circuit courts.
The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that a judge
may find the fact that a defendant committed a crime while on super-
vised release without violating the Sixth Amendment. These Circuits
reason that such a fact falls under the prior conviction exception as
articulated in Apprendi. Although the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have
not explicitly ruled on the precise question, their holdings suggest that
they might side with the majority position."
The Second Circuit in United States v Fagans" relied on a presen-
tence report to enhance the defendant's sentence for possessing a stolen
firearm in violation of 18 USC § 9220)." More specifically, the district
court increased the defendant's criminal history category under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines because the report indicated that the
defendant committed the offense while on a probationary term of six to
71 See, for example, United States v Becerra-Garcia, 28 Fed Appx 381, 385 (6th Cir 2002)
(holding that a judge may determine that the defendant's prior conviction was for an aggravated
felony); United States v Campbell, 270 F3d 702, 704 (8th Cir 2001) (holding that a judge may
determine that the defendant's prior convictions were for violent felonies).
72 406 F3d 138 (2d Cir 2005).
73 Id at 141. Many sentencing judges determine a defendant's supervised release status
based on presentence reports, court files, or records kept by the departments of corrections. See
Tyesha E. Lowery, One "Get Out of Jail Free" Card: Should Probation Be an Authorized Courts-
martial Punishment?, 198 Milit L Rev 165,175 (2008) (discussing judges' reliance on presentence
reports). Probation officers write presentence reports, which contain a compilation of a defen-
dant's criminal history, describe facts of mitigation and aggravation, and recommend sentences
to judges. Id. Defendants have the opportunity to rebut findings contained in the reports, al-
though the report itself and assertions made in the reports are not subject to more rigorous
evidence rules at trial. See United States v Sherlin, 67 F3d 1208, 1218 (6th Cir 1995). Hearsay
evidence, for example, may be admitted at the sentencing hearing. Thus, sentencing hearings do
not have full Sixth Amendment protections, although the defendant does retain his right to
counsel. McConnell v Rhay, 393 US 2,4 (1968).
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twelve months from a state conviction.4 Though acknowledging the
uncertain scope of the prior conviction exception, the Second Circuit
claimed that "the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence
imposed seem logically to fall within this exception" and thus did not
implicate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights."
The Seventh Circuit in United States v Williams 6 upheld the dis-
trict court's finding of prior convictions and the fact that the defendant
committed the offense while on probation." The defendant in Williams
was convicted under 18 USC § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of
a firearm as a felon. His criminal history, including the fact of his proba-
tionary status at the time of the offense, placed him in the highest crim-
inal history category under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." In a
presentence report, the probation officer recommended a sentencing
range of 92 to 115 months.9 Without the defendant's criminal history,
his sentence would have ranged from 33 to 41 months."
In light of Almendarez- Torres, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the prosecution need not prove a defendant's criminal history to a
jury in order for the court to apply sentence enhancements." The Se-
venth Circuit defined "criminal history" to include prior convictions or
"the nature of those convictions," including the defendant's probatio-
nary status at the time of the crime.82 Furthermore, the Williams court
stated that subsequent cases have not only left the Almendarez- Torres
holding "undisturbed" but have also acknowledged its "continuing
74 A convict's supervised release status is determined by a supervised release proceeding,
which may result in changes to the length of his release. If a court has authority to impose and
subsequently modify terms of a defendant's supervised release, the clerk will record these
changes of his release status in court documents. See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 1203.3(a).
Other times, a parole board, following a grant or revocation of parole, will determine a defen-
dant's supervised release status. In such cases, parole officers create and maintain such records.
The probation officer might make reference to such records, court files, and any records of con-
viction in drawing up his presentence report. Federal and state laws also regulate the form and
content of a presentence report. As with sentencing hearings, supervised release proceedings
lack full Sixth Amendment protections. See Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471,480 (1972).
75 Fagans, 406 F3d at 142.
76 410 F3d 397 (7th Cir 2005).
77 Id at 398. Although the Seventh Circuit remanded the district court's sentence, it did so
because the district court believed the Sentencing Guidelines to be mandatory before Booker v
United States, 543 US 220 (2005), had been decided, not because its findings violated the Sixth
Amendment. Williams, 410 F3d at 404.
78 Id at 399.
79 Id. In Williams and Fagans, the defendants did not object to the presentence report.
Williams, 410 F3d at 399; Fagans, 406 F3d at 141.
80 Williams, 410 F3d at 401.
81 Id.
82 Id at 402.
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validity."83 Although the Seventh Circuit recognized that the Almenda-
rez-Torres holding might be in tension with Apprendi, Blakely, and
United States v Booker," it felt bound to follow Almendarez-Torres
until the Supreme Court overruled it.93
The Tenth Circuit in United States v Corchado" upheld a sentence
enhancement based on the fact that the defendant sold heroin while
he was on probation for a previous drug conviction.n This fact in-
creased the defendant's criminal history category under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.n As a result, the defendant's sentence range
increased from 70 to 87 months to a range of 87 to 108 months when
coupled with his offense level.89 Finding no Sixth Amendment viola-
tion, the Tenth Circuit relied on Almendarez-Torres to apply the prior
conviction exception to "subsidiary findings" or "certain facts related
to [prior] convictions" such as whether the defendant was under court
supervision when he committed the crime.90 Moreover, the Corchado
court justified its holding by pointing to recidivism as "a traditional, if
not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an
offender's sentence." 9' In United States v Pineda-Rodriguez,n the Tenth
Circuit also pointed out that facts such as a defendant's supervised
release status are "easily verified" and their use as sentence enhance-
ments "requires nothing more than official records, a calendar, and the
most self-evident mathematical computation."93
A majority of circuits have upheld the constitutionality of judicial
factfinding of supervised release status based on a broad reading of
Almendarez-Torres, finding that the fact of supervised release is ana-
logous to that of a prior conviction.
2. State courts.
Although of less authority than federal circuit court decisions,
state court decisions confronting constitutional challenges to sentenc-
83 Id.
84 543 US 220,226-27 (2005) (holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment insofar as they were mandatory and subsequently rendering the Guidelines advisory).
85 Williams, 410 F3d at 402.
86 427 F3d 815 (10th Cir 2005).
87 Idat819.
88 See USSG § 4Al.1(d).
89 Corchado, 427 F3d at 819.
90 Idat 820.
91 Id, quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 243.
92 133 Fed Appx 455 (10th Cir 2005).
93 Id at 458.
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ing statutes are important in tracking the different ways in which
courts have reacted to Apprendi and Blakely. Since Booker rendered
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, defendants have increa-
singly brought Sixth Amendment challenges against state statutes that
allow enhancements based on judge-found facts.
Most recently, the California Supreme Court in People v Towne'
made three primary arguments as to why a jury need not find the fact
that the defendant committed a crime while on parole. First, a defen-
dant's parole status is an aspect of recidivism, an exception recognized
by Almendarez-Torres. Echoing arguments made in Almendarez-
Torres, the Towne court stated that "recidivism is not related to the
commission of the present offense" and thus is "indistinguishable from
a prior conviction."9 Second, it reasoned that the record of a defen-
dant's parole status is usually "well documented in the same type of
official records used to establish the fact and nature of a prior convic-
tion-court records, prison records, or criminal history records main-
tained by law enforcement agencies."" And third, the Towne court
stated that Sixth Amendment procedural safeguards attend the fact of
a defendant's parole status at the time of the crime because such a
circumstantial fact "arises out of a prior conviction."97
The Washington Supreme Court in State v Jones similarly held
that a judge could increase a sentence based on a factual finding that
the defendant was on community placement at the time of the offense.
The court stated that the judge may rely on "the criminal history sub-
mitted, and those documents flowing from the prior conviction and sen-
tence, such as the presentence report and department of corrections'
records."'9 To justify such judicial factfinding, the court concluded that,
similar to the prior conviction inquiry, finding that the defendant's re-
lease status is "inherently reliable" satisfies Sixth Amendment proce-
dural safeguards because the status "arises out of a prior conviction,"
and "is the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges."'.
Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court analogized to She-
pard. Because Shepard allowed judicial examination of documents oth-
er than the prior conviction document, such as jury instructions and
the plea transcript, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that
94 186 P3d 10 (Cal 2008).
95 Id at 19.
96 Idat 20& nn 6-7.
97 Id at 20.
98 149 P3d 636 (Wash 2006).
99 Idat642.
100 Id.
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courts can likewise examine presentence reports."' Such judicial doc-
uments are reliable because they are records "flowing from the prior
conviction" and thus contain adequate procedural safeguards man-
dated by the Sixth Amendment. ''
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court in Ryle v State... ruled that
the presentence investigation report documented by the probation
officer was sufficiently reliable such that a jury need not examine the
evidence of a defendant's probationary status contained therein."'
First, it noted that Indiana law set forth training and various other
requirements for probation officers that "ensure[d] the reliability of
their work product."'05 Second, the court analogized to Shepard. Un-
like the police reports at issue in Shepard, the presentence investiga-
tion report compiled by the probation officer in Ryle was not "too far
removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record."'"6
Specifically, the report referred to conviction documents as well as de-
partment of corrections documents to conclude that the defendant was
on a two-year probation term when he committed the offense. '
State courts have thus emphasized three primary justifications for
judicial factfinding: tradition, procedural safeguards, and reliability.
B. The Minority View: Prohibiting Judges from Finding Supervised
Release Status under the Prior Conviction Exception
1. The Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit is the sole circuit to prohibit a judge from find-
ing supervised release status under the prior conviction exception,
holding instead that a jury must find the fact. In Butler v Curry," the
Ninth Circuit ruled that a jury must make such a finding because a
judicial determination of the defendant's status runs afoul of the Sixth
101 Id at 643.
102 Jones, 149 P3d at 643.
103 842 NE2d 320 (Ind 2005).
104 Ryle, 842 NE2d at 324-25. The state prosecuted Kenna Ryle under the 2003 version of
Indiana's penal code, which required the court to impose a presumptive sentence unless it found
aggravating factors. Ind Code Ann § 35-50-2-4 (West 2004). In 2005, Indiana changed its sentenc-
ing statute to provide for "advisory" terms, where a judge could impose any sentence within the
sentencing range at his discretion. 2005 Ind Legis Serv PL 71-2005 (West).
105 Id at 324.
106 Id at 325, quoting Shepard, 544 US at 25.
107 Ryle, 842 NE2d at 325.
108 528 F3d 624 (9th Cir 2008).
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Amendment.'W The state court judge imposed an "upper term" sen-
tence under California's determinate sentencing law based on a find-
ing of an aggravating fact (committing a crime while on probation),
where based on the jury verdict alone the judge could only impose a
"middle term" sentence."0 The Butler court held that this judicial fact-
finding violated Blakely.'
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Shepard and drew a
constitutional distinction between facts contained in conviction docu-
ments and all other facts, including those reflected in probation docu-
ments. The Ninth Circuit stated that "Shepard limited the considera-
tion of prior convictions at judicial sentencing to those facts that can
be established by the 'prior judicial record' of conviction. ' ' .. Unlike
the judge-based majority position, the Ninth Circuit narrowly con-
strued the definition of a "prior judicial record" to include only "facts
directly reflected in the documents of conviction, not [ ] secondary 'facts
that are derived or inferred' from a prior conviction or from the convic-
tion documents....3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit would preclude from judicial
examination records from the department of corrections or parole
boards, which arguably "flowed from" the prior conviction document.
Acknowledging that probationary status is "likely to be recorded
in court documents," the Ninth Circuit nevertheless emphasized the
importance of safeguards that attend a criminal conviction."' It con-
cluded that the reliability of the records depended on the proper
process: "[T]he prior conviction exception is justified by the reliability
of court documents created as part of a process with Sixth Amend-
ment safeguards.". 5 Based on this justification, the Ninth Circuit also
allowed a judge to find the defendant's initial sentence because such a
fact would be reflected in conviction documents. In certain cases, a
109 Id at 647-48. But see Horton v Schwartz, 2008 WL 4907607, *10-13 (CD Cal) (ruling that
the fact of a defendant's length of incarceration falls within the prior conviction exception).
110 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the application of California's determinate sentencing law
before it was amended in 2007 to allow for judicial discretion in imposing a penalty, similar to
how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were made advisory by Booker. See Cal Penal Code
§ 1170(b) (West 2007), amended by 2007 Cal Legis Serv ch 3 (SB 40) (West). However, the court
suggested that on remand, the petitioner Butler would be resentenced under the 2007 law, not
under the law as how it was written when he committed the crime. Butler, 528 F3d at 652 n 20.
111 Butler, 528 F3d at 628. See also Cunningham v California, 549 US 270,275 (2007) (find-
ing California's determinate sentencing law to be unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment).
112 Butler, 528 F3d at 644.
113 Id at 645, quoting United States v Kortgaard, 425 F3d 602, 610 (9th Cir 2005).
114 Butler, 528 F3d at 646.
115 Id at 645. See also id at 647 ("Insofar as these cases [from the other circuits] held only
that the question whether the defendant was originally sentenced to probation at the time of
conviction comes within the Almendarez-Torres exception, we do not disagree.").
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judge might use the fact of an earlier sentence to enhance a defen-
dant's current sentence. "'
The Ninth Circuit described the parole process and how it does
not comport with Sixth Amendment standards.' Parole may be re-
voked or modified according to due process standards, which are more
relaxed than what the Sixth Amendment demands.18 The court stated
that the judge can modify supervised release terms at any time.. and
that certain modifications may have fewer procedural safeguards than
those attached in probation revocation hearings.'O Furthermore, the
court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that the Ninth Circuit did
not apply the prior conviction exception to convictions as a juvenile or
to prior removal proceedings. Supervised release, juvenile, and prior
removal proceedings all "lack full Sixth Amendment protections.' 2'
Notably, courts that review Apprendi errors will determine such
errors to be harmless, and thus not reversible, when the "judge was
presented with sufficient documents at sentencing ... to enable a re-
viewing or sentencing court to conclude that a jury would have found
the relevant fact beyond a reasonable doubt."'22 Thus, even under the
Ninth Circuit's approach, defendants "will [not] always, or even often,
obtain relief when a judge, rather than a jury, has made such a find-
ing..'.. Although this practically presents a loophole under the Sixth
Amendment, the defendant is still afforded protection under the rea-
sonable doubt standard. In contrast, the judge-based majority view
assesses recidivism-related facts using a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.
116 See, for example, 8 USC § 1326(b) (providing that in cases of reentry of certain removed
aliens, earlier convictions and the type of sentences imposed may be used to increase the alien's
sentence).
117 See Butler, 528 F3d at 646-47.
118 Id, citing Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 488-89 (1972) (holding that the minimum
requirements of due process in a parole revocation hearing include written notice, disclosure of
evidence, the right to confront witnesses, and the opportunity to present evidence in front of a
neutral hearing body, among other safeguards).
119 Butler, 528 F3d at 646.
120 id at 647.
121 Id at 644. For a discussion of the circuit split on whether juvenile convictions should be
treated as prior convictions under Apprendi, see Molly Gulland Gaston, Note, Never Efficient,
but Always Free: How the Juvenile Adjudication Question is the Latest Sign that Almendarez-
Torres Should Be Overturned, 45 Am Crim L Rev 1167, 1175-84 (2008) (arguing that the prior
conviction exception should not apply to juvenile convictions).
122 Butler, 528 F3d at 647 n 14.
123 Id.
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2. State courts.
A minority of state appellate courts have also refused to extend
the prior conviction exception to the fact of a defendant's supervised
release status. The Arizona Court of Appeals, in State v Gross,'24 held
that the trial court violated Apprendi when the judge found that the
defendant committed two felonies while on supervised release.'2 The
court in Gross asserted that the "plain language in Apprendi requires
that the defendant's release status be submitted to the jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."' The jury verdict exposed the defendant
to a maximum punishment of seven and a half years in prison, but his
release status finding exposed him to nine and a half years.
The Gross court acknowledged that the trial court could simply
review "objective, documentary evidence" with relative ease in deter-
mining the defendant's release status.17 However, it stated that this cha-
racteristic of factfinding was not relevant in deciding whether a judge or
jury should make the determination. Instead, the question should be
whether or not a fact increased the maximum punishment: "Under Ap-
prendi, it is a defendant's exposure to additional punishment, not the
ease or accuracy with which that fact can be determined by a trial court,
that is pivotal in triggering" a defendant's right to jury factfinding.'2
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v Wis-
sink ' ruled that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the felony while on probation." The court cited
two reasons for its position. First, it was "bound by the language" in
Apprendi and Blakely, stating that "only the fact of a prior conviction
is exempt from being proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'.'
124 31 P3d 815 (Ariz Ct App 2001).
125 Id at 818.
126 Id. At the time, the Arizona court held the sentencing provision unconstitutional, where
the provision allowed the trial judge to enhance the defendant's sentence based on his bail sta-
tus. The Arizona state legislature since amended its sentencing law to require a jury finding to
impose a mandatory minimum within a statutory range. See Ariz Rev Stat §§ 13-701(c), 13-708.
127 Gross, 31 P3d at 819.
128 Id.
129 617 SE2d 319 (NC Ct App 2005), affd in part and revd in part, 645 SE2d 761 (NC 2007).
The court analyzed the 2003 version of North Carolina's sentencing law under which the defen-
dant was sentenced, which allowed a court to enhance a defendant's sentence based on his su-
pervised release status. NC Gen Stat § 15A-1340.14(a), (b)(7) (2003) (creating a point system
that adds one point for offenses committed while on supervised release). The state legislature
amended the law in 2005 (presumably in response to Blakely) to require a jury to find such a fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. 2005 NC Sess Laws 145.
130 Wissink,617 SE2d at 325.
131 Id.
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Second, the fact of the defendant's probationary status lacked the sa-
feguards of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which
were "recognized in Apprendi as providing the necessary protection
for defendants at sentencing.' 32 The North Carolina Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed this ruling."'
In sum, the lower courts remain divided over the proper interpre-
tation of the prior conviction exception. Although both sides claim that
their positions follow the Sixth Amendment, the judge-based majority
view places more emphasis on tradition, whereas the jury-based minori-
ty view focuses on the procedural safeguards in the prior proceedings.
III. SOLUTION
This Part proposes a solution that is distinct from both the majority
and minority views, concluding that the fact of a defendant's supervised
release status does not fall within the prior conviction exception. That is,
if a defendant might have committed his crime while on supervised re-
lease, a judge cannot find this fact to increase the maximum sentence.
As a result, prosecutors must plead the fact in an indictment and prove
it to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part III.A explains that the Supreme Court's justification for the
prior conviction exception has shifted from tradition to the fact that
the prior conviction proceeding satisfies Sixth Amendment safeguards.
Thus, the judge-based majority position is not tenable so long as it
continues to make the highly contested claim that judges traditionally
find facts related to recidivism.
Part III.B proposes that a judge can increase the maximum sen-
tence only upon finding facts that were previously and necessarily
(1) found by a jury for conviction, (2) admitted by the defendant pur-
suant to a guilty plea, or (3) found by a judge for conviction in a bench
trial. As a result, a judge cannot find the fact of a defendant's release
status. In all three types of prior proceedings, the defendant is af-
forded full Sixth Amendment protections, unless properly waived.
Thus, the proposed rule includes a narrower reading of the prior con-
viction exception than either the judge-based or the current jury-based
view. The judge-based view allows the judge to find facts that are re-
lated to the prior conviction, including the defendant's supervised re-
lease status. The jury-based view allows the judge to find the fact of an
earlier sentence imposed by the judge -a fact not found by the jury.
132 Id.
133 See Wissink, 645 SE2d at 761.
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Part III.C shows that the judge-based view fails to satisfy a de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. It also attempts to
supply the judge-based view with a stronger doctrinal argument to
support factfinding by a judge. The stronger version of the judge-
based view argues that where a jury conviction authorizes the judge to
impose a term of supervised release, it also authorizes the judge or
parole board to subsequently modify the length of the release. If a
judge can find the fact of a defendant's previous sentence to enhance
his current sentence, as the jury-based view allows, then the judge
should be able to find the defendant's supervised release status. Yet,
such a solution ultimately fails because the "facts reflected in the jury
verdict," not what the jury authorizes, are what judges may find to en-
hance a defendant's sentence.""
Part III.D argues that the jury-based view as articulated by the
Ninth Circuit similarly fails, even though it reaches the correct result.
The current jury-based view provides a justification that is inconsis-
tent with Sixth Amendment case law as reflected in Apprendi, Blakely,
and Shepard. To the extent that it allows a judge to find the fact of a
defendant's previous sentence, the Ninth Circuit's view becomes indis-
tinguishable from the judge-based view. Unlike a jury conviction, the
subsequent sentence imposed by a judge is not found by a jury. But
the Ninth Circuit, like the judge-based position, allows a judge to find
facts that arose from proceedings authorized by the jury. Instead, this
Comment proposes that a judge may find only facts that a jury found
previously-a rule that is narrower than the current jury-based posi-
tion but more consistent with Sixth Amendment doctrine.
Part III.E applies the new rule to a typical sentencing statute to
illustrate how it would operate in practice and how it would function
differently than either the majority or minority rules.
A. Emphasizing Procedural Safeguards over Tradition
The Supreme Court has identified two primary ways to justify the
prior conviction exception: (1) tradition and (2) the presence of Sixth
Amendment safeguards in the prior conviction proceeding. A court's
traditional authority to find recidivism-related facts is one justification
given by the Almendarez- Torres Court. Another justification is ensur-
ing that Sixth Amendment safeguards accompany the recidivism-
related fact. The conflict between the two justifications arises because
the argument based on tradition does not require that Sixth Amend-
134 See Blakely, 542 US at 303.
1342 [76:1323
Prior Conviction Exception
ment safeguards accompany the recidivism-related fact. If the prior
conviction exception were grounded solely on tradition, as interpreted
by Almendarez-Torres, then a judge would be able to find supervised
release facts, even though a jury in the prior proceeding did not find
those facts.
Yet after Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
justified the prior conviction exception on the basis that a jury had es-
tablished the conviction in the prior criminal proceeding. Beginning
with Jones, the Court held that unlike other facts of enhancement, "a
prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.'. 5
Then, in Apprendi, the Court pointed out that the jury procedural safe-
guards attending the fact of a prior conviction "mitigated the due
process and Sixth Amendment concerns," in situations where a judge
finds a fact to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum. 116 Such justifications for the prior conviction exception mark
a subtle but notable point of departure from Almendarez-Torres.
Cunningham v California' also deemphasized the tradition ar-
gument. Attempting to preserve California's determinate sentencing
regime, the state supreme court asserted that the law "simply author-
ize[s] a sentencing court to engage in the type of factfinding that tradi-
tionally has been incident to the judge's selection of an appropriate
sentence within a statutorily prescribed sentencing range."'' Striking
down California's sentencing law as violating the Sixth Amendment,
the Supreme Court rebuked this argument by citing approvingly to
Judge Joyce Kennard's concurring-dissenting state supreme court opi-
nion: "Nothing in the [US Supreme Court's] majority opinions ... sug-
gests that the constitutionality of a state's sentencing scheme turns on
whether ... it involves the type of factfinding that traditionally has
135 Jones, 526 US at 249.
136 Apprendi, 530 US at 488. Furthermore, the Apprendi Court asserted:
[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction
entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to
find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
Id at 496.
137 549 US 270 (2007).
138 People v Black, 113 P3d 534,543 (Cal 2005) (emphasis added), vacd by Black v California,
549 US 1190 (2007) (vacating the California Supreme Court decision in light of Cunningham).
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been performed by a judge."... Although the Court in Cunningham
was not directly analyzing the prior conviction exception, its emphasis
on procedural safeguards over tradition signals a similar trend.
Further, the argument that recidivism-related facts were tradi-
tionally found by a judge is less compelling in this context because the
system of supervised release is a modern phenomenon.'" There does
not appear to be any strong historical analogue to supervised release
violations as a basis for sentence enhancements. Thus, Almendarez-
Torres's account of recidivism as the traditional province of the judge
cannot be so easily transplanted into the context of supervised release
findings. Hence, any solution must ask whether the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were fully protected before a judge enhances his
sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
B. Proposal: "Facts Reflected in the Jury Verdict Alone"
Courts should apply the prior conviction exception in a way that
is consistent with the rulings of Apprendi, Blakely, and Shepard. To
that end, judges can increase the maximum sentence only upon find-
ing facts that were previously and necessarily (1) found by a jury for
conviction, (2) admitted by the defendant pursuant to a guilty plea, or
(3) found by a judge for conviction in a bench trial.' Thus, a judge
may find only the fact of the prior conviction itself or facts that were
necessary to support the prior conviction. A defendant's release status
does not fall into this category.
The Apprendi Court stated that a defendant could not be "ex-
pose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.''..
139 Cunningham, 549 US at 289 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the Towne court asserted
that judicial factfinding of recidivism-related facts is "one more typically and appropriately under-
taken by a court," echoing language that had been rejected by Cunningham. Towne, 186 P3d at 19.
140 Although the early origins of probation can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, probation was not available for all adult criminals until 1956. Probation and Parole: History,
Goals, and Decision-making: Origins of Probation and Parole, 3 Crime and Justice, online at
http://Iaw.jrank.org/pages/1817Probation-Parole-History-Goals-Decision-Making-Origins-
probation-parole.html (visited Sept 1, 2009); Marc R. Lewis, Comment, Lost in Probation: Con-
trasting the Treatment of Probationary Search Agreements in California and Federal Courts, 51
UCLA L Rev 1703, 1708 (2004).
141 Because the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment jury trial right in the last two scena-
rios, this Part will only focus on the first scenario: whether a jury had already found facts contested
at a sentencing hearing for a later crime. Further, the analysis of the first scenario will lead to the
same outcome as would an analysis done under the second and third scenarios. However, the focus
on the first scenario does not mean that the latter two scenarios are not just as important.
142 Apprendi, 530 US at 483 (emphasis omitted).
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In clarifying Apprendi's language, which was misinterpreted by some
courts as dictum,' 3 the Court in Blakely further emphasized the pri-
macy of jury factfinding, where it held that a judge could not impose a
sentence exceeding that justified "solely on the basis of facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.'""' Apprendi and
Blakely force the conclusion that a jury must find the fact of a defen-
dant's supervised release status at the time of the crime. It is true that
the Blakely Court did not mean an earlier jury verdict when it re-
ferred to "the jury verdict." Nevertheless, its reasoning applies as a
justification for the prior conviction exception when read together
with Apprendi, which explicitly upheld the prior conviction exception.
The fact of supervised release status is not reflected in the jury
verdict or an earlier verdict and cannot be used as an enhancement
beyond the maximum. By contrast, a prior conviction would have
been found by a jury, and it would have been reflected in the earlier
jury verdict. As the conviction encompasses all of the facts and ele-
ments necessary to that particular conviction, a judge may also find
such facts and elements to enhance a defendant's sentence. Although
circumstantial or mens rea facts necessary for conviction are not techni-
cally a fact of conviction, a judge may find such facts because they are
reflected in the jury verdict. '5
Shepard further buttresses interpreting the prior conviction ex-
ception in this way. In Shepard, the Court analyzed what kinds of doc-
uments may be examined by a sentencing judge in order to decipher a
facially ambiguous conviction document. ' It held that the judge may
look at the "charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the fac-
tual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some
comparable judicial record of this information.' ' .7 For jury trial cases,
the Court in Taylor v United States" similarly held that a court could
look to statutory elements, charging documents, and jury instructions to
find that the defendant's previous conviction was for burgling a build-
ing.,,9 It is important to note-and this is where both the judge-based
143 See, for example, Black, 113 P3d at 534, vacd by Black, 549 US 1190; State v Ring, 200
Ariz 267 (2001), revd, Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584 (2002).
144 Blakely, 542 US at 303 (emphasis omitted).
145 For example, if the prior conviction was for murder, the intent mens rea can be found by
the judge in the later criminal proceeding.
146 See Shepard, 544 US at 26.
147 Id (emphasis added).
148 495 US 575 (1990).
149 Id at 602.
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and jury-based positions go astray in analogizing to Shepard-that the
underlying inquiry was what facts the jury found or to which the defen-
dant pleaded guilty. That basic premise, grounded in Apprendi and
Blakely, was undisputed. Rather, the only dispute in Shepard and Taylor
was over the kinds of documents that may be examined to clarify what
the jury found or to what the defendant pleaded guilty."
C. The Majority View Fails
Courts following the majority view advocate three basis claims to
support judicial factfinding. First, courts rely on Almendarez- Torres
for the proposition that a judge may find facts related to recidivism,
including a defendant's release status at the time of the crime. '
Second, they cite to Shepard for the proposition that a court may look
to "comparable judicial record[s]" to determine a defendant's release
status. ' Third, courts assert that Sixth Amendment safeguards are sa-
tisfied because the fact of a defendant's release status is a fact that
"arises out of" a prior conviction."3
All three claims lack adequate justification. First, Almendarez-
Torres, although not overruled, has been sharply questioned by subse-
quent Court decisions."' Almendarez- Torres itself did not deal with the
fact of a person's supervised release status, but only with the defen-
dant's prior conviction. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
also limited the Almendarez- Torres holding to the specific recidivism-
related fact of a prior conviction. "' To read Almendarez-Torres as al-
lowing a judge to find all recidivism-related facts ignores Apprendi's
interpretation of Almendarez- Torres. Further, the Apprendi Court
pointed out that the defendant in Almendarez-Torres had admitted his
prior convictions and challenged the findings made by the judge be-
cause they were not included in the indictment. And again, courts
cannot rely heavily on Almendarez-Torres's tradition argument be-
cause the Supreme Court has moved away from that justification.
150 See Shepard, 544 US at 22 (dismissing the government's position that argued for a judge
to examine testimony about a building break-in because the jury verdict would not have necessarily
rested on that finding); Taylor, 495 US at 602 (allowing judges to examine documents showing "that
the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict") (emphasis added).
151 See Part II.A.1.
152 See Part II.A.2; Shepard, 544 US at 26.
153 See Part II.A.2; Towne, 186 P3d at 20.
154 See Apprendi, 530 US at 487 (stating that Almendarez-Torres "represents at best an
exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described").
155 See id at 488 ("[Olur conclusion in Almendarez- Torres turned heavily upon the fact that the
additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was the prior commission of a serious crime.").
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Second, as alluded to in Part III.B, Shepard did not allow a judge to
look at documents in order to determine facts other than prior convic-
tions or the necessary facts underlying those convictions. The Shepard
Court concluded that charging documents, jury instructions, and "com-
parable judicial record[s]" could be reviewed to clarify what the defen-
dant admitted to in his plea or what the jury must have found in order
to convict."" Nevertheless, the Indiana court in Ryle likened probation
documents to the Shepard documents, noting that "probation officers
are trained, tested, hired, and supervised directly by the judiciary.. 7 But
the relevant point is whether those documents indicated facts that a
jury found-not how professionally prepared those documents were.
Because the fact of a defendant's supervised release status is not a fact
necessary for conviction, Shepard does not help the majority.
Third, although the defendant's release status "arises out of" or
"flows from" the prior conviction in a general sense, such ambiguous
language cannot substitute for sound analysis. A jury does not find
facts that would lead to the modification of a defendant's release sta-
tus. Yet, the judge-based position would use such determinations
created from a process without Sixth Amendment safeguards to en-
hance a defendant's sentence. As the jury-based view rightly points
out, such enhancements would violate Apprendi and Blakely. But
there is a stronger argument for the judge-based view that even the
current jury-based view cannot rebut.
When the jury convicts a defendant, it authorizes a relaxed form
of factfinding in supervised release proceedings. Just as the conviction
allows a judge to impose a term of incarceration or supervised release,
the conviction also authorizes modifications of the supervised release
term based on a judge's or a probation officer's factfinding. The initial
sentence along with any subsequent changes to it are all part of the
defendant's original sentence. If a judge may find the defendant's sen-
tence, as even the jury-based position allows, then the judge should also
be able to find the defendant's release status for enhancement purposes.
Both facts are created by the judge or the parole board and are pro-
duced in a post-verdict process authorized by the jury's finding of guilt.
Neither fact is found by a jury, though. And under Blakely, it is
not what the jury authorizes but what it finds that matters constitu-
tionally.' Blakely holds that a judge may impose a maximum sentence
based only on facts reflected in the jury verdict. Apprendi holds that
156 Shepard, 544 US at 26.
157 Ryle, 842 NE2d at 324.
158 See Blakely, 542 US at 303.
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the prior conviction exception is justified because a jury already found
the earlier conviction. This common emphasis on jury factfinding sup-
ports the proposed rule that a judge can only find facts that were pre-
viously found by a jury.
There is also a slippery slope problem for the judge-based view. If
a judge can use the fact of a defendant's supervised release status to
enhance his sentence, can the judge use the fact of his poor perfor-
mance on supervised release to do the same? '59 If so, can the judge also
use the fact that a defendant possessed illegal drugs while on super-
vised release to convict him in a subsequent criminal proceeding? The
logical extension of the judge-based position would allow judicial fact-
finding in these cases based on prior jury authorization. But clearly,
convicting a defendant for possession of illegal drugs without a jury trial
goes against the Sixth Amendment. It is true that a judge may use these
facts to revoke the defendant's term of supervised release. But the
judge cannot use these facts to impose a separate sentence or to impose
enhancements to a separate sentence, unless a jury finds these facts.
D. The Minority View Fails
Although courts embracing the minority view reach the right re-
sult, their justifications are inconsistent with Apprendi and Blakely.
Those courts correctly state that because a jury did not find facts that
determine a defendant's supervised release status, the fact of the de-
fendant's status does not fall under the prior conviction exception.'
However, the Ninth Circuit also ruled that the sentence initially im-
posed by a judge would be a fact "coming within the prior conviction
exception. ' '6 The Ninth Circuit cited to Shepard to support its rule
allowing a judge to find "facts that can be established by the 'prior
159 While the California Supreme Court in Towne held that a judge could find a defendant's
parole status, it stated that a jury must find a defendant's unsatisfactory performance on parole.
186 P3d at 20. The Towne court offered two reasons for this distinction. First, a defendant's per-
formance on parole "does not relate to a prior conviction." Id at 21. Second, a finding of unsatis-
factory performance is not accompanied by Sixth Amendment procedural safeguards because
parole revocation proceedings do not require a right to a jury trial. Id. Yet, these two reasons also
apply to a finding of a defendant's parole status at the time of the crime. A defendant's parole status
"relates" to a prior conviction in the same way that a person's performance on parole relates to the
prior conviction-that is, both facts arise out of a prior conviction. Moreover, a defendant's parole
status may have been modified after the initial sentencing, and such changes are not accompanied
by Sixth Amendment safeguards See Butler, 528 F3d at 646. Thus, the court's line-drawing seems
less motivated by doctrinal consistency and more so by administrative convenience.
160 See, for example, Butler, 528 F3d at 646-47.
161 id at 645.
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judicial record' of conviction.' 62 Thus, the fact of an earlier sentence
imposed may be used to enhance a defendant's sentence under the
Ninth Circuit's reading. For example, certain statutes may allow for a
sentence increase if the defendant had committed a prior "aggravated
felony.' 63 A statute may define an aggravated felony in many ways.
For example, it may be defined as a crime whose penalty, imposed by a
judge, is more than a year of imprisonment."6
There are two problems with the jury-based view, as expressed by
the Ninth Circuit in Butler. First, a defendant's supervised release sta-
tus and his sentence share a common trait in that a jury finds neither
of these facts. These facts are created by the judge or parole board
subsequent to the jury conviction. Although "documents of convic-
tion" as defined by Butler may record a defendant's sentence, Blakely
requires that enhancements be based on what the jury finds.'6' The jury
verdict is the relevant document, not the conviction document record-
ing the sentence imposed.
Importantly, a sentencing hearing-like a supervised release pro-
ceeding-lacks full Sixth Amendment safeguards. 16 A jury is not
present at the sentencing hearing, where the judge considers facts in
mitigation and aggravation in imposing a sentence within the statutory
range. Also, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does
not apply because the judge may consider hearsay evidence. 1 ' Never-
theless, the jury-based view, like the judge-based view, would take a
fact not found by the jury and use it to enhance a defendant's sen-
tence beyond the statutory maximum. It is true that the jury authoriz-
es a judge to impose a sentence within the statutory range. Yet again,
identical to the response to the failed argument of the judge-based
view, it is not what the jury authorizes but what it finds for conviction
that is constitutionally significant.
Second, the jury-based view misinterprets Shepard in the same
way as the judge-based position. When the Shepard Court referred to
a "prior judicial record," it did not mean a prior judicial record of con-
viction that included the sentence imposed, as was interpreted by the
Ninth Circuit. Rather, the Shepard Court referred to judicial records
162 Id at 644, quoting Shepard, 544 US at 25.
163 See, for example, 8 USC § 1326(b), cited by Butler, 528 F3d at 645 n 13.
164 See, for example, 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(F)-(48)(B), cited by Butler, 528 F3d at 645 n 13.
165 Butler, 528 F3d at 645.
166 Still, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches during sentencing hearings. See
McConnell v Rhay, 393 US 2, 4 (1968) ("The right to counsel at sentencing must ... be treated
like the right to counsel at other stages of adjudication.").
167 See Sentencing Hearing, 21 Am Jur 2d Crim Law § 742 (2008).
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"made or used" by the court in adjudicating guilt.'6' Sentencing docu-
ments are not "made or used" by the jury to determine a defendant's
guilt. Instead, they are produced in a post-verdict sentencing hearing
that lacks Sixth Amendment safeguards. The documents that a judge
may examine, under Shepard, are used to determine what the jury
found or what the defendant admitted to in the guilty plea, and nothing
more.' ' Blakely supports such an interpretation of Shepard because it
states that a judge can impose a maximum sentence "solely on the basis
of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 7
The jury-based view propounded by the Ninth Circuit reaches a
different conclusion from the judge-based view because court records
showing subsequent changes to a defendant's sentence of probation
are not reflected in the "documents of conviction." According to the
Ninth Circuit, the defendant's initial sentence is recorded in such doc-
uments, and thus a judge may rely on facts contained therein. At first,
the initial sentence appears to be integral to the conviction in a way
that subsequent changes to the sentence are not. To justify this intui-
tion, the Ninth Circuit in Butler stated that a record of the defendant's
initial sentence, as opposed to a record of subsequent changes to the
sentence, is "created as part of a process with Sixth Amendment safe-
guards.""' But this is false. As discussed above,"2 a sentencing hearing
does not contain full Sixth Amendment protections. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's approach fails to explain the distinction between the initial
sentence and the modified sentence in other terms.
One distinction between an initial sentence and a modified sen-
tence may be that a judge imposes the former but a parole board im-
poses the latter. But no court on either side of the split thinks this is a
relevant difference. Another distinction between a sentence initially
imposed and a modified sentence is sequence. It may be that a modified
sentence is less reliable because it is further removed from the trial ver-
dict. Yet this question turns on how an institution maintains its judicial
records, which can vary greatly from state to state. Apprendi's bright-
168 544 US at 21, 25 ("The Government argues for a wider evidentiary cast, however, going
beyond conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt and looking to documents submit-
ted to lower courts even prior to charges.").
169 For a similar interpretation of Shepard to the one offered in this Comment, see United
States v Medina-Almaguer, 559 F3d 420,423 (6th Cir 2009) (holding that a court cannot increase a
sentence by relying on officer testimony that the defendant had previously bought heroin because
such testimony does not show that the defendant "necessarily admitted" to buying heroin).
170 Blakely, 542 US at 303 (emphasis omitted).
171 Butler, 528 F3d at 645.
172 See notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
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line rule does not allow for this kind of analysis. More importantly, the
point is whether the records were produced in a process with Sixth
Amendment jury protections, not how well they were maintained.
In sum, although the minority view reaches the correct outcome, its
justification does not comport with Apprendi, Blakely, and Shepard.
E. Application and Implications for State Sentencing Regimes
The earlier sections demonstrate that a judge may not find the
fact that the defendant committed his crime while on supervised re-
lease. The judge, however, may still find the fact of a defendant's prior
conviction to enhance his sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
Under the relevant Supreme Court precedent, a judge may only find
facts previously and necessarily (1) found by a jury for conviction, (2)
admitted by the defendant pursuant to a guilty plea, or (3) found by a
judge for conviction in a bench trial. Shepard also limits the kinds of
documents that a judge may examine to find the fact of a prior convic-
tion or facts that were necessarily encompassed by the prior conviction.
Suppose a defendant is convicted of selling heroin and faces a
statutory minimum of fifty months and a maximum of ninety months
in prison. The state statute allows for an increase of thirty months if a
judge finds a prior conviction. The presentence report records that the
defendant had a previous drug conviction. The judge may rely on the
presentence report prepared by the probation officer, police reports,
and additional testimony to impose any sentence within the fifty to
ninety month range.
Under Shepard, however, the judge cannot rely on the report
alone to enhance the sentence by thirty months. Such a report, drawn
up by a probation officer, is analogous to a police report in Shepard in
that neither was produced in a setting with Sixth Amendment safe-
guards. The judge can only look to a record of the verdict. If only a
specific kind of drug or a specified quantity can trigger the sentence
enhancement under the statute, ' then under Shepard, the judge may
also look to the indictment and jury instructions to determine the ne-
cessary facts found by the jury in convicting the defendant for the
previous drug charge.
Suppose instead that the state statute allows for a sentence increase
based not just on any prior felony conviction, but on a prior aggravated
felony conviction. The statute defines an aggravated felony as a crime
173 See, for example, NY Penal L § 220 et seq (specifying different classes of crimes for
various quantities of controlled substances).
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that authorizes a sentence of at least one year in prison, independent of
what sentence a judge may impose. The prosecution presents a record
of the defendant's earlier conviction for a crime that carries a six to thir-
ty month sentencing range. A judge may impose the sentence en-
hancement based on a finding of prior conviction after examining She-
pard-approved documents. A jury had earlier convicted the defendant
of a crime, which is an aggravated felony by statutory definition.
If, instead, an aggravated felony is defined as a crime for which a
judge previously imposed an imprisonment term of more than a year, '
then the later sentencing judge may not find the fact of the earlier
sentence imposed to determine whether the prior conviction was for
an aggravated felony in order to increase the maximum sentence. The
Ninth Circuit mistakenly allows such judicial factfinding."' However,
under the proposed approach, such judicial factfinding would not be
allowed because a jury did not find the fact of a defendant's sentence.
If the statute allows for a sentence increase based on the fact that
the defendant committed the crime while on supervised release,'7' then
a jury must find this fact before a judge applies the sentence enhance-
ment. Further, the trial may have to be bifurcated to prevent prejudice
to the defendant. The portion of the indictment charging the defen-
dant's crime while on release may be read after the jury convicts the
defendant, and the court can hold a separate factfinding proceeding.
In the wake of Apprendi and Blakely, several states have mod-
ified their sentencing regimes to comport with Sixth Amendment re-
quirements. For example, Kansas's sentencing guidelines state that a
jury must find the factors that "may serve to enhance the maximum
sentence.'.. Kansas also allows the court to conduct a "separate de-
parture sentence proceeding" if the defendant is subject to sentence
enhancements beyond the statutory maximum." Alternatively, Arizo-
na's criminal code imposes a mandatory minimum, or a mandatory
maximum for more serious offenses, if the "trier of fact" finds that the
174 See, for example, 8 USC § 1101(a)(48)(B) ("[R]eference to a term of imprisonment or a
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confine-
ment ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of
that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.").
175 See Butler, 528 F3d 624, 645 n 13 ("Indeed, we have permitted judges to make factual
findings regarding the sentence initially imposed for a prior conviction.").
176 See, for example, Wash Rev Code §§ 9.94A.525(19), 9.94A.535(2)(d) (creating a point
system and adding one point for offenses committed during post-release supervision).
177 Kan Stat Ann § 21-4718(b)(7).
178 Kan Stat Ann § 21-4718(b)(4). See also Adam Liptak, Justices' Sentencing Ruling May
Have Model in Kansas, NY Times A12 (July 14, 2004) (describing a post-conviction jury finding
of a probation violation that "tacked about an hour onto a four-day jury trial").
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defendant committed the offense "while released from confinement,"
defining the trier of fact to mean a jury.1
79
State statutes that presently allow judges to find that defendants
committed the crime while on release violate the Sixth Amendment.
That a defendant's release status may be reliably recorded is irrelevant.
The defendant is not afforded a jury factfinding process to determine
his status. State statutes that allow judicial factfinding of release status
to raise the sentencing maximum can be corrected in one of three ways:
(1) include the marginal increase in punishment as part of the statutory
range, as Arizona does, (2) prohibit sentence enhancements based on
release status altogether, or (3) require a bifurcated jury factfinding
procedure, as Kansas does. While several states have modified their sta-
tutes after Blakely, many have not yet done so. The Sixth Amendment,
as articulated by the Apprendi line of cases, demands a higher level of
protection for criminal defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Court has provided two related strands of justification-
tradition and Sixth Amendment procedural safeguards-to support
the prior conviction exception, although the Court appears to rely
increasingly on the latter justification. The tension between tradition
and procedural safeguards continues to animate the debate among the
lower courts over whether a judge can find supervised release facts. To
resolve the debate, this Comment has proposed a new approach in
applying the prior conviction exception to be consistent with Appren-
di, Blakely, and Shepard. A judge may find only facts reflected in an
earlier jury verdict of conviction or a guilty plea in order to raise a de-
fendant's sentencing ceiling. Thus, a judge may not find that the defen-
dant committed a crime while on supervised release in order to en-
hance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum-only a jury can.
179 Ariz Rev Stat §§ 13-701(c), (j), 13-708.
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